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On August 1, 1966, the Ford Foundation proposed the creation of a
federally-chartered non-profit corporation to establish and operate a
domestic communications satellite system for the transmission of radio
and television programs and to use the cost-savings thereby realized for
the support of educational television (ETV).1
This article discusses the economic merits of the particular method
of financing encisaged in the Ford proposal. Accordingly, we are not
directly concerned with the case for additional public support for
ETV. We take that case as proved, and consider the benefits of such
support only to the extent necessary to reach a verdict on the method
proposed for raising the funds. Nor are we concerned with the par-
ticular administrative arrangements proposed. 2 The question we pose is
simply whether it would be appropriate to finance ETV by withholding
from the television networks the cost-savings made possible by the use
of domestic communications satellite to provide their interconnections,
charging them not the lower cost of satellite transmission but something
closer to what they now pay.3
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1. Comments of the Ford Foundation in Response to the Commission's Notice ofInquiry of March 2, 1966. In re The Establishment of Domestic Non.common Carrier
Communications-satellite Facilities by Non-governmental Entities, Dkt. 16495 (FCC,
Aug. 1, 1966). See also later submissions by the Foundation in the same proceedings,
Dec. 12, 1966, and April 3, 1967; Hearings on the Ford Foundation Proposal for a Broad-
casters Non-Profit Satellite Service Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 89-78 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966
Hearings].
2. Thus, we do not consider the question of whether it might be more efficient tocombine all domestic satellite communications in a single carrier, as proposed by the
Communications Satellite Corporation, rather than have the broadcast transmission
services handled separately by Ford's Broadcasters' Nonprofit Satellite Service. See 1966
Hearings 119-23 (remarks of Mr. McCormack).
3. There are any number of ways in which the Federal Communications Commission
might choose to organize the domestic satellite system and to distribute the benefits among
various users of communications services. We address ourselves only to the alternative of
providing broadcasters with interconnection services at the lower costs of satellite trans.
mission.
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Our analysis must start with the proposition that any proposal to hold
prices above cost (including in the latter a return on investment equiva-
lent at least to the cost of capital) is prima facie objectionable on eco-
nomic grounds. The economic rational of a competitive market econ-
omy is principally that effective competition holds prices down to cost-
that, moreover, it spurs constant savings in costs which it then forces
producers to pass on to consumers in the form of lower prices. And
the logic of regulation in the public utility arena, where technological
considerations preclude complete reliance on competition, is that it
strives for the same result.
There are, however, two principal limitations of the competitive
model as a guide to public policy, and both are directly relevant here.
First, many markets are not effectively competitive. Television broad-
casting is one such market: distortions and imperfections are already
present. Public intervention in the form of taxation and subsidy may
therefore produce an improved rather than a poorer performance.
Second, the competitive model does not permit the financing of
desirable public services-that is, of economically justifiable uses of
resources which are not sufficiently provided by the operation of the
market mechanism; and we here assume that ETV is such a service.
Except for levies on pure economic rents-the single tax advocated by
Henry George-there are practically no neutral taxes; no taxes, that is,
that do not in one way or another distort the functioning of a price
system. Individual excise taxes alter the relationship between price and
production cost, hence artificially discourage the consumption of some
of the taxed commodities compared with others; and general excise
taxes affect the decisions of households to expend on consumption or to
save. Income taxes are taxes on work, saving, and investment; so they
too introduce an extraneous consideration into these decisions.4
The economic question that must be asked about any tax, then, is
whether the distortions it introduces are serious (both absolutely and
as compared with available alternatives) and how these negative effects
compare with the positive benefits conferred by the service thus pro-
vided. On balance, that is, do the tax and subsidy together result in a
better or a worse allocation of resources? There is also a political ques-
tion to be considered. Every tax and subsidy changes the distribution
4. See R.. MusGEAvE, TnE THEORY oF PUBLIC FiNr'cE 140-59 (1959); for a survey of some
of the literature, see Ruggles, Recent Developments in the Theory of Marginal Cost
Pricing, 17 R.v. EcoN. STUmDs 107, 110-11, 119 (1949). As Musgrave points out, a head
tax would be neutral and so would taxes imposed on goods or activities (including leisure)
which have zero rates of substitution-i.e., the demand or supply of which is unresponsive
to the tax-caused change in relative price.
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of income: the incidence of taxes and benefits will not be identical.
Accordingly, in appraising the tax one must also ask whether the par-
ticular methods of financing comport with the community's standards
of fairness in the distribution of burdens and benefits.
The Ford Foundation's proposal shows up unusually favorably in
the light of these considerations. The distortions it introduces, its effect
in discouraging the supply and consumption of the taxed services, will
in our judgment be slight; the tax selected is a particularly fair and apt
method of providing for the benefits envisaged; and the combined
effect of the levy on the one hand and the ETV services it will be used
to finance, on the other, will be to produce not a poorer but a markedly
better allocation of resources to and within television. These conclu-
sions rest on a series of interrelated economic propositions which this
paper will develop and analyze:
1. The major economic objection to holding some prices above
cost is that any such policy unduly discourages utilization of the services
in question; the weight of the objection therefore depends on the
elasticity of demand. In the present instance, the elasticity of demand
is low.
2. The television industry as now constituted is economically de-
fective. Its structure fails to conform to the competitive model, and
it fails to make optimal use of the limited radio spectrum. Reducing
the rates for network interconnections would do comparatively little
to improve its economic performance.
3. Use of the cost-savings to support ETV instead would make a
much greater contribution to remedying some of these very defects.
The combined effect of the levy on the one hand and its use to subsidize
ETV on the other would therefore be to improve the economic per-
formance of this industry.
The relevant political propositions, to which we devote relatively
little attention, are these: (a) it is particularly appropriate to finance
ETV in this fashion because the cost-savings to be diverted to this
public purpose are themselves largely the product of taxpayer-financed
research and development;5 (b) the question is not one of levying addi-
tional burdens on the television networks, but only of refraining from
5. This consideration does not answer the specific and more challenging question of why
these particular cost-savings from this particular taxpayer-financed research should be
recouped and, if so, used for this particular public purpose: why, for example, recover
the cost-savings only from broadcast networks rather than from all users of communications
services? And why use the proceeds for ETV rather than, say, to help pay the cost of
national defense, the poverty programs or public schools? These were, essentially, the
queries posed by the Presidents of CBS and NBC. See 1966 Hearings 187, 191-94, 198.
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passing on to them this particular bonus;0 (c) the kinds of income that
would be increased if the bonus were passed on are mainly monopoly
profits and economic rents, themselves resulting from the free gift of
valuable franchises for use of the spectrum.
I. The Consequences of Passing the Savings on in Lower Rates to
TV Networks
The proper way to assess the economic costs of the Ford Foundation's"tax" proposal is to consider the various possible consequences of taking
the opposite course of decreasing the charges the networks pay for
transmitting programs to affiliated stations by the amount of the savings
enjoyed as a result of transmission by satellite. The following five sub-
sections would seem to exhaust those possibilities.
A. Increase in Network Profits
The first consequence of passing the new economies along to the
networks would undoubtedly be an increase in network profits. The
costs of networking would be diminished, and at least initially network
rates and revenues would be unchanged. To the extent that the net-
works merely retained these additional profits, the reduction in rates
to them would confer no social or economic benefits at all on the
economy at large.
By all indications, network profits are already far above the level
which would be necessary to attract capital if entry were otherwise
free. Unfortunately, since the financial data reported by the Federal
Communications Commission lump together the operations of the net-
works as such and those of their owned and operated television sta-
tions, we have no regularly published figures on the profitability of
the former alone. We can, however, make some fairly sound surmises
about their profitability on the basis of what we do know. As Table 1
shows, the before-tax profits earned by the three networks and their
15 owned and operated stations in 1966 amounted to no less than 148.2
per cent of their net investment in tangible broadcast properties. How-
ever this figure exaggerates the rate of return on their total capital
investment because it does not include working capital. If, for example,
6. This too is a political consideration: a "tax" is generally more palatable if it repre.
sents merely a withholding of future benefits rather than a taking of something people
already have. In economic terms the distinction is unimportant: the eil consists in intro.
ducing a gap between price and cost, whether by imposing a tax that forces price up
relative to cost or by holding up price as costs fall.
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TABLE 1
RATES OF RETURN, BEFORE TAX, ON INVESTMENT IN TANGIBLE BROADCAST PROPFRTY,
1958-66 (in %)
Three Networks and Their Owned Other Commercial Television
And Operated TV Stations Stations
Rate of Return Rate of Return Rate of Return Rate of Return
on Original on Depreciated on Original on Depreciated
Cost Cost Cost Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1958 56.6 93.2 24.5 45.0
1959 62.7 109.6 31.8 60.0
1960 67.8 124.0 32.9 65.7
1961 63.9 119.3 30.3 61.4
1962 78.4 148.3 37.7 76.2
1963 87.4 162.7 36.5 75.2
1964 95.1 172.8 42.0 85.7
1965 96.8 166.0 41.3 81.5
1966 91.3 148.2 37.8 72.2
Source: Federal Communications Commission, Annual Reports, 1959.66, and TV Broad-
cast Financial Data-1966 (mimeo., Aug. 25, 1967).
their investment in working capital was as great as the net book value
of their investment in tangible broadcast properties, their rate of profit
ought to be reckoned at 74.1 per cent rather than 148.2 per cent.7
Further, the independent networking operations are probably less
profitable than station ownership and operation; accordingly, we may
perhaps go as far as to halve again the foregoing figure to get a roughly
accurate picture of the return on stockholders' equity in networking. 8
These adjustments make the contrast between network profits and the
the profit rate in industry generally a good deal less dramatic,0 but the
7. One limited piece of evidence suggests that this correction may be of the appropriate
order of magnitude to reflect their rate of return on equity. The FCC's network studyfound that in 1955 the network operations alone of CBS and NBC earned 87.7 per cent
(as always, before federal income tax) on depreciated investment in tangible property and
40.2 per cent on equity. HousE CoMm. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMER CE, NETWonK
BROADCASTING, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 204 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
NETwoK BROAD CASTING]. The data it presented do not permit us to determine whether
the ratio of net investment in tangible property to stockholders' equity for the network
operation alone, reflected in the difference between the 87.7 and 40.2 per cent rates,
would be appropriate for owned and operated stations as well, profits for which arc
included in our 148.2 per cent figure for 1966.
8. This second adjustment would bring the 1965 figure close to the 40.2 per cent
earned in 1955. See note 7 supra. In that year, CBS and NBC earned 278.7 per cent on
depredated tangible investment in their stations, compared with the above cited 87.7 per
cent in networking. NETwoRK BROADCASTING 204. Since the 1966 data were received after
this paper was completed, the textual references to them are few.
9. After-tax profits of the 3,862 corporations surveyed by the First National City Bank
amounted to 11.1 per cent on owners' equity in 1965, suggesting a return of something
like 22 per cent before tax. Monthly Economic Letter, April 1966, at 41.
The fact that the ABC network is apparently far less profitable than CBS and NBC
498
Vol. 77: 494, 1968
Communications Satellites and Educational Television
adjustments are probably excessive and in any case the return is still
comparatively very high.'0 Thus, the conclusion that network profits
are considerably greater than would be necessary to attract capital but
for the enormous barriers to entry still seems valid."' Rates of return
of this order of magnitude strongly suggest that no social purpose is
served by any reduction in rates that would merely serve to increase
profits.
But of course even monopolies earning unusually high profits may
well respond to a reduction in the price of their inputs by expanding
their output and reducing prices. In what ways might the networks
make such a response to a reduction in the price of interconnections?
B. Increased Expenditures on Programs
One dimension of the "output" of networks is the quality of their
programs. Setting aside for the moment the question of whether and
in what sense increased expenditures on programming do in fact lead
to improvements in quality, we must concede that in some sense higher
outlays are a way of attempting to achieve this result. And it is
conceivable that a reduction of transmission costs could either permit
or induce the networks to spend more money in this fashion on pro-
grams, thus passing on the benefits to their "consumers"-advertisers
on the one hand, viewers on the other.
There is, however, no economic reason whatever to expect such a
direct response, at least in the area of regular programming."- A reduc-
(reportedly suffering a $9 million loss on total revenues of $320 million in 1966, Albrook,
TV's Autumn of Appraisal. FoRruNE, Oct. 1967, at 136-37) raises the additional question of
whether the high profits in question are properly attributable to the monopolistic charac-
ter of "the industry" or to special advantages of the two dominant firms. See note 10 infra.
10. It is not clear to what extent one is justified in completely separating the network
and station profits, to what extent, that is, the networks' ownership of the by-far mont
lucrative stations (see Table 1 supra; see also ANTrTRusT Sucomm. OF TIIE HOuSE Com.a,.
ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON TE T.LEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY, HR. E. No. 607,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-33 (1957) [hereinafter cited as the Crum Cosmrrra ROtr]: in
1966 the before-tax profits of the 15 network-owned stations amounted to no less than
41 per cent of revenues; the corresponding figure for the 593 other stations reporting to
the FCC was not quite 50 per cent; TV Broadcast Financial Data-1966) is independent
of their dominant position as networks. See Nrwor, BR oADC.srTNG 571-72, 579.84; United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 US. 334 (1959); consent decree, 1959 Trade Cas.
75752 (ED. Pa. 1959). Or, to put it another way, it is not clear to what extent the lovwer
profits nominally earned on the networking operations (a loss in the =re of ABC) are not
appropriately regarded as merely nominal, a price these companies must pay to provide
adequate programming for their extremely profitable stations.So it is impossible from the available statistics to assert to what extent the networks'
very high rate of return on their combined operations reflects an absence of effective
competition among them in their role as networks--that is, as suppliers of television pro-
gramming to affiliated stations-and to what extent instead strictly economic rents earned
by their owned and operated stations.11. This is the conclusion also of NEm'onK BROADCASTING 203-06.
12. For the significance of this qualification, see p. 502 infra.
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tion in transmission costs has no effect whatever on the cost of pro-
ducing programs. Before any such reduction, the networks presumably
have been determining their optimum expenditures on program qual-
ity by comparing the costs of production with the anticipated revenues
from advertising, for programs of various qualities and degrees of ex-
pensiveness. More specifically, if they are operating rationally, they
have been maximizing their profits by increasing outlays on program
quality only insofar as the incremental costs thereof were exceeded by
the incremental revenues. There is no reason why a mere reduction in
regular interconnection charges 3 should in any way alter that calculus,
since it would have no direct impact on either the cost or the revenue
functions. It might conceivably have an indirect effect on the latter:
by enabling the network to induce a larger number of stations to carry
its programs, a reduction in interconnection charges might increase
the price advertisers would be willing to pay for programs of a given
quality. We shall consider this possibility in more detail below; but
since we shall conclude that the tendency of a reduction in charges to
increase the total audience for network programs (and thus the value
of the programs to advertisers) will be slight, its potential indirect
effect on the revenue function can be ignored in the present discussion.
The crucial economic consideration is that the rates the networks
pay for continuous interconnections represent a fixed, not a variable
cost of regular programming; and it is reductions in variable costs only
(defined in the short or long run) that may lead to increases in output.
If, then, before the rate reduction went into effect, a network would
have rejected the next possible improvement in programming, because
the cost would be, say $1,000, whereas advertisers would be willing to
pay for it only an additional $990, the same incremental outlay would
still be unprofitable after the reduction in transmission rates went
into effect. The relevant program improvement would still cost $1,000
and (absent the indirect effect alluded to above) advertisers could still
be expected to pay no more than $990 for it.
This reasoning applies only if the networks are profit-maximizers, but
we see no reason to doubt the essential validity of that premise. Their
profit rates clearly suggest a policy of charging what the traffic will bear.
It is true that the networks do put on public service programs on which,
nominally at least, they lose money. But two considerations suggest that
this practice does not basically qualify our assumption about their true
13. These are the monthly contractual rates the networks pay for eight- or sixteen.
hours-daily connection with their affiliated stations.
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nature. First, networks do not ordinarily show such programs during
prime viewing hours, when the loss in revenues would be most severe.
Second, to some extent they feel obliged to engage in public service
programming for profit-maximizing reasons: recognizing that as bene-
ficiaries of extremely valuable public franchises their performance is
under public scrutiny, they regard some programming of this kind
as a necessary price to pay for the continued enjoyment of their privi-
leges with a minimum of regulation.
It must be conceded that the motivation for public-service program-
ming is in part non-pecuniary. Television executives are certainly not
immune to the instinct of workmanship. But to the extent that this is
their motivation, the quality of their programs is not responsive to
ordinary economic incentives. In either case, then, there is no econom-
ically reliable basis for predicting that any reductions in transmission
costs would be translated into a more public-service-oriented per-
formance on the part of the networks.14 Moreover, it should be kept
in mind that the alternative envisaged by the Ford Foundation proposal
would devote the totality of the cost-savings directly and explicitly to
the support of ETV.15
14. Our reasoning here is in partial conflict with that of Harvcy J. Levin, when
he declines to endorse the introduction of competitive bidding for renewial rights of
existing station licenses for fear that this change would, by shortening the time horizons
of existing broadcasters, lead to a debasement of program quality-a prediction based
explicitly on the premise that broadcasters are not pure profit.maximizers. Levin, Federal
Control of Entry in the Broadcast Industry, 5 J. LAw & Eco. 58-61 (1962). We do not
here appraise his conlusion, but it is not necessarily inconsistent with ours: he is referring
to the possible effects of reducing broadcasters' profit to the purely competitive level andexposing them periodically to the possibility of losing their franchises to higher bidders;
we refer to the likely effect on program quality of increasing the already supernormal
profits of established, dominant networks.It would seem tha t he inreasingly intense competition among the networks in program
outlays, which is apparently responsible for the recent decline in their rates of returnreflected in Table 1 (To give only two examples. NBC spent $1.5 million on the 1954
Olympic Games in Tokyo; ABC recently offered $4.5 milion for the broadcast rights onthe 1968 summer games. The prices paid for old movies have increased in a few" years from$100,000 to an average of $650,000. Albrook, Ti's Autumn, FORTUNE, Oct. 1967, at 19.226 & _ssim.) similarly reflects a failure to profit-maximize. The explanatory modlwould seem to be that of an imperfectly"collusive oligopoly, competing in an intensifyingprocess of what J.. Clark has termed "product inflation." J. CLanx, CoPrrrnoO As ADYNAmic PxOCFSS 252-57 (1961). In this event, lower costs of transmission might well givethe networks additional dollars, some of which they might spend in bidding up evenhigher the prices of programs and talent. But see note 15 infra.The unlikelihood of their being used to put on more public servie or network-sponsredprograms is suggested by the fact that, as the demand for prime time and its price haverisen, the networks have apparently reduced programming of this kind. See Vidal ClassyTV, Nw Yoan Rawve OF BooS, Dec. 7, 1967, at 27/.15. Our argument has, we think, shown that it would be illogical for the networks toincrease their expenditures on commercial programming because of a reduction in trans.mission costs. What if we are mistaken: what if they were to apply the cost-savings forthis kind of purpose? In large measure, the increased expenditures would not benefit theviewing public at all, but would go---as they have gone in recent iears-to bid up the
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However, one important category of charges for interstate transmis-
sion is a variable cost of programming; namely the costs of occasional,
as opposed to regular, interconnections. Reductions in such costs could
therefore result in a significant improvement in program offerings, The
costs of set-ups for special news or sports events--the earthquake in
Alaska, the Olympic games in Mexico City-in places which (in con-
trast with, say, the White House) have no regular hook-ups with the
networks, can be extremely high and do play an important role in
determining whether the programs in question will be produced.10 By
obviating the necessity of laying costly special lines, the satellite could
produce cost-savings which-if passed on-would induce the networks
to offer a fuller and richer variety of special-events programming of
this kind.
It would therefore be very important, if the Ford Foundation pro-
posal were adopted, for the satellite corporation to set up two cate-
gories of charges (as does A.T.8:T. at present): one for regular, normal,
fixed interconnections and another for occasional hook-ups. Demand
for the former, we have concluded, is inelastic, so far as programming
effort is concerned; and there can be no economic objection based on
considerations of program quality to holding charges for them far above
incremental costs. Demand for the latter could well be highly elastic,
justifying a reduction of charges down to incremental costs. Our support
for the Ford proposal is therefore conditioned on its recognition of
this distinction between the two sets of charges.
C. Reduced Rates to Advertisers
The possibility that lower interconnection charges might lead to
reductions in the rates charged for advertising can be dismissed sum-
marily. In their relations with advertisers, the networks are not char-
itable organizations. There seems no reason to doubt that they charge
whatever the traffic will bear. What they have to offer to advertisers is
prices networks pay for old movies, for the right to televise sporting contests, for salariesof established entertainers: that is, they would merely inflate economic rents. It must beconceded that these expenditures would also to some extent go to develop new enter.
tainers, to sponsor new programs, and the higher prices would encourage additions tothe supply. But the nature of the competition, as we will point out below, would mainly
be such as to develop performers and performances essentially duplicative and Imitative
of those currently !broadcast. The contrast with the way in which these funds would be
used if the Ford Foundation proposal were adopted requires no further elaboration.
16. [T]he Network Study Staff was informed that the occasional use rates dis-
couraged all but the largest stations from televising live events outside their local
community. A number of stations contended that current program transmission rates
made such broadcasting of special events uneconomic.
NkiWom tR6ADcASTNd 546.
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a certain amount of time associated with programs of various possible
qualities and various corresponding probable audiences. Reduction in
the fixed costs of transmission to network affiliates will not directly
alter the amount of time they have available to sell, or induce them
to alter the quality of the programs. Nor will it, therefore, alter the
amounts that advertisers are willing to pay for various units of time at
various hours associated with programs of various qualities. In short,
it will directly change neither the demand nor the relevmt supply
or cost functions.' 7 Accordingly, networks have no reason whatever to
respond to reduced interconnection rates by cutting their prices to ad-
vertisers. (The effect of the possible indirect chain of circumstances
already suggested-reduced interconnection charges permitting more
stations to be added to the package offered to advertisers-could only
increase the time charges, by making given programs and units of time
more valuable than before-i.e., by moving the advertisers' demand
curves to the right.)'8
17. Though the amount of program time actually available is fixed, it Is still true
that some network programs go unsponsored; lower rates might, therefore, incase sales.
But if the networks felt that the demand was sufficiently elastic so that they could obtain
more total revenues from time sales by reducing their rates, either generally or relectively,
they would have done so in any case, without uniting for a reduction in the fixed trans-
mission charges.
18. This conclusion would seem to conflict with Joseph A. Pechman's contention that
the imposition of a gross receipts tax on the broadcasting industry "would doubtless be
shifted fairly promptly in higher charges to advertisers ... " Submission of the FordFoundation, vol. I, at 37, in FCC Dkt. 16245 (Dec. 12, 1965). Reduced interconnection
charges would either have no effect on charges to advertisers or would increase them. A
tax on gross broadcasting receipts would either have no effect on these charges or would
decrease them. To set forth our reasoning in detail would unduly burden this article; we
therefore confine ourselves here to brief statements of the two reasons for our prediction.
First, to the extent that the broadcasting industry as a whole sells a fixed amount of
available time for whatever the traffic will bear, the imposition of a tax will not alter the
optimum price from its point of view; and the tax will therefore come out of its economic
rents. If the industry could have recovered larger net revenues from advertisers by raising
rates, there is no reason why it would not have done so before the tax was imposed.
But, second, a gross receipts tax (in contrast with higher interconnection charges) is a
tax on the variable costs of programming, which would therefore be expected to make anygiven incremental expenditures on program quality less attractive than before. For exam-
ple, the networks might, before imposition of the tax, have found it profitable to make an
incremental expenditure of $1,000 on programs, because advertisers were willing to pay
$I,010 in additional fees in order to have their messages associated with that superiorproduct. The imposition of a 5 per cent gross receipts tax would make that incremental
expenditure unprofitable, since of the $1,000 additional revenue only $959.59 would remain
with the networks. Therefore, the tax could induce a reduction in the expenditures foroutput, along the "quality" dimension. The effect of such a reduction in the industry's
marginal revenue (or increase in its marginal cost) curve would probably therefore increasethe average cost to advertisers of reaching any given number of viewers-i.e., the tax would
probably be passed on, in the familiar manner, in an increase in customers' costs per viewer.
It is difficult to see, however, that this change could make advertisers willing to pay higher
charges than before per hour of program time. The hours now offered them are of poorer
quality, will attract fewer potential customers; they will presumably therefore bring a
lower, not a higher price.
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D. Increased Distribution of Revenues to Affiliated Stations
The costs of interconnection are an important determinant of how
large a share of network advertising revenues is distributed to the
affiliated stations. They affect both the standard compensation arrange-
ments and the differences in the way individual stations are treated.
For example, since the costs of connecting small stations are large rela.
tive to the revenues they promise to generate, such stations tend to
receive less favorable compensation, and are in some cases required to
assume the costs of interconnection themselves.10 There are two forces
tending to perpetuate this relationship between interconnection costs
and the revenues of affiliated stations. One is the competition among
networks for desirable affiliates.20 The other is the desire of each net-
work to influence its affiliated stations to take network programs instead
of selling their own time directly to advertisers.21
There seems little reason to doubt that competitive pressures would
force the networks to pass on to their affiliates and to other stations on
the margin of affiliation a large portion of any savings in transmission
costs. But whether this windfall to the affiliates would improve the allo-
cation of resources and not merely transfer income to the station-
owners, depends on the elasticity of response by stations, existing and
potential, to those higher proffered revenues.
Assume at one extreme (1) that all existing stations are already
hooked up with networks-or that interconnection costs are no obstacle
to their becoming affiliated, (2) that the spectrum is full, so that there
is no room for entry of new stations, and (3) that such additional in-
ducements to carry network programs as reduced interconnection
charges would enable the networks to offer their affiliates, would be
too small to influence the latters' programming decisions. In these cir-
cumstances, the interconnection costs may be taken as fixed charges,
with no effect on output. Thus, with the relevant dimension of "out-
19. NToWRK BROADAsrING 448-50, 455-61, 541, 546.
20. Id., 462-66.
21. See Peterman, The Structure ol National Time Rates in the Television Broadcasting
Industry, 8 J. LAw & ECON. 86-91 (1965), for a discussion of the delicate balance of eco-
nomic considerations determining the equilibrium reached by each individual station
between network and national spot time sales. A poignant illustration of the pressure
this exerts on the networks is provided by the difficulties of ABC, which suffers not only
from having fewer affiliates than its two older competitors but also from the fact that Its
stations "tend to unplug the network shows more frequently in favor of profitable local
programming, part of a vicious circle in which smaller national audiences mean lower
network advertising rates, lower paymqnts by the network to the stations, less use of net-
work programming by the stations, and so on down the spiral." Albrook, supra note 14,
at 137. Clearly the money-losing ABC network might well use savings in interconnection
costs to improve its compensation arrangements with affiliates.
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put" defined as the number of viewers to whom network programs -
are made available, supply proves to be inelastic, unresponsive to the
reduction in costs; the benefits are not passed on to the viewing
public.
Suppose instead that the possible network connections with various
existing stations are incomplete, or that existing affiliates carry fewer
network programs than they would if offered greater compensation, or
that additional stations might be set up were it economically feasible
for them to receive network programs. And suppose, finally, that the
costs of interconnection are a factor determining the feasibility of
extending network audiences in any of these ways. In these circum-
stances, the costs of interconnection are a variable cost and determine
the level of output along this particular dimension. Assume, for in-
stance, that advertisers are willing to pay a fixed amount per minute
of time per potential viewer. In the circumstances just described, there
will be some stations (existing or potential) which are presently just
beyond the margin of taking network programs, because the size of
the additional audiences they can offer network advertisers is simply
too small relative to the cost of serving them to permit networks to
offer them sufficient compensation, but which may be brought into
network service if the interconnection rates are reduced.
Almost certainly the facts are as described by the second rather than
the first extreme alternative. The number even of VHF stations con-
tinues to increase annually; as advertising demand for television time
gradually increases, it becomes possible to establish new stations. There
is also room in the spectrum for many new UHF stationsi if only their
entry were economically feasible. The networks are not completely
hooked up with all potential affiliates 24 hours a day and do not have
access to all homes in the country, so that their transmission costs are
in some measure variable in determining output as defined. Affiliates
are constantly making decisions to take or not to take the programs
offered them. And transmission costs are large enough to exert some
influence on these output decisions. Supply is not completely inelastic.
The critical questions, however, relate to the dimensions of these
potential benefits: how expandable is supply likely to prove in response
to reduced rates? Significantly, as Table 2 reveals, while the number of
commercial TV stations increased dramatically in the first decade after
22. Since the possible expansion of output includes the induced entry of new stations,
the broadcasting of non-network as well as of network programs could be expanded.
23. See note 52 infra.
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TABLE 2
Nu?,oxR OF COMMERCcIAL TELEVISION STATIONS, 1955-65, VHF AND UHF,
WrH YEAR-TO-YEAR PERCENTAGE CHANGE
VHF UHF TotalEnd of _________ ________ _______ __
Year Number % Change Number % Change Number , Change
1950 107 0 107
1955a 334 25.6 103 437 82.5
1956 379 13.5 96 -6.8 475 8,7
1957 410 8.2 91 -5.2 501 5.5
1958 432 5A 82 -9.9 514 2.6
1959 442 2.3 78 -4.9 520 1.2
1960 454 2.7 76 -2.6 580 1.9
1961 459 1.1 81 6.6 540 1.9
1962 471 2.6 83 2.5 554 2.6
1963 479 1.7 86 3.6 565 2,0
1964 483, 0.8 92 7.0 575 1,8
1965 488 1.0 100 8.7 588 213
1966 494 1.2 113 13.0 607 3.2
a The percentage change for 1955 is the average annual increase, 1950.55, compounded.
Source: FCC Annual Reports, 1956-66, and TV Broadcast Financial Data-1966.
World War II, the annual rate of increase has tapered off very sharply
since 1957.24
The tapering off is particularly striking in the case of VHF stations:
as the table indicates, their growth rate has fallen almost to zero.2 1 This
drastic decline occurred, moreover, in the face of a sustained rapid
growth in broadcast revenues (see Table 3) at a generally constant rate
during the same decade, and a consequent dramatic increase in profita-
bility (reflected in Table 1).20 Manifestly, the responsiveness of VHF
entry to increased profits has sharply diminished in this period.
24. Only nine stations were authorized as of Jan. 1, 1945. U.S. DEP'T ov Co~mE:RuE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1966 STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF THE U.S. 519.
25. Arguments for considering VHF and UHF separately, as substantially non-com-
peting groups, are presented infra.
26. Since 1958 was a recession year, it may be that the increase in profitability i1
exaggerated by beginning our table with that year. Unfortunately, comparable ratios for
the years immediately preceding are not available. We do have the following percentage
returns on depreciated cost for the three networks and their owned and operated stationg
for 1953-55, to compare with column (2) in Table 1: 41.9 per cent, 81.9 per cent and
124.7 per cent, respectively. Computed from CELLER CoMmmER REPO=T 28-80. The trend
in these figures is heavily influenced by the very sharp increase in the profitability of net.
work operations alone during these years. Another indication that the 1958 ratios may be
on the low side for purposes of characterizing the long-run trend in profitability Is the
following data for broadcast net income before taxes of the "other commercial stations"-
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The reason is in part physical: the number of available but unutilized
VHF channels is approaching exhaustion'2 7 particularly in the dense,
lucrative markets. - 8 As the "lucrative" qualification suggests, the reason
is also in part economic; the available channels remaining are located
in thinly populated areas. Since, as we have seen, interconnection
charges are large in comparison to prospective revenues in those areas,
some few additional VHF stations would probably be set up if the
rates were reduced. But the percentage increase in the number of
families served by existing networks would be even smaller than the
rise in the number of stations. In 1967, CBS and NBC were already
able through their current affiliates to reach 99 per cent of all homes
with TV, and the rate for ABC was 95 per cent.20
Other indirect evidence indicates that those stations which might be
induced to enter are marginal in the sense that they would increase
household coverage only slightly: the newer existing stations, as might
be expected, are apparently far less profitable and take in much smaller
revenues on the average than their older counterparts. 0 Similarly,
network affiliates in small markets are markedly less profitable than
those in dense markets.31
The UHF spectrum is of course much more nearly empty, with only
about one-sixth of the available commercial channels filled as of early
1966.a2 Since the passage of the all-channel television receiver law in
196 233 required all new television sets to be equipped to receive UHF
signals, the principal historical obstacle to new entry-the fact that
1960 148.9
1965 286.3
21-31 F.C.C. ANN. REP. (1955-65). On the other hand, as Table 3 indicates, the growth of
revenues in 1958 was not out of line with the post-1956 trend.
27. As of June 1, 1967, there were 552 available commercial VHF channels in the
contiguous 48 states; 488 were occupied by authorized stations and four more were the
subject of pending applications. Information supplied by the FCC.
28. Hearings on Television Allocations Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8, at 4587 (1960). Most of the unoccupied
commercial VHF channels are in the West, ten in Montana alone. Information from the
FCC.
29. 'Estimates supplied by private communications from the companies. Their programs
have even fuler potential coverage since they may be ordered also by non-affiliates.
30. See Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 GEo. LJ. 1, 16 n.50
(1961). The FCC supplied separate financial data only through 1960 for VHF stations
certificated before and after (the resumption of licensing in) 1952. In 1960, the 93 older
stations reported before-tax profits of $98.5 million on total broadcast revenues of $303.2
million; the 346 post-freeze stations reported profits of $50.1 million on revenues of $293.9
million. TELEVISION FAcT BooK 45-a (1966).
31. NwrnvoR BRoADCAsTIc 197-98.
32. In February of 1966, the Commission assigned 1098 channels to UHF, 516 of which
were for ETV, and pointed out that others could be added "as the need arists." 32 F.C.C.
ANN. REPr. 100, 103 (1966). Cf. Table 2 supra.
33. 47 US.C. § 303(s), 76 Stat. 150 (1962).
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most sets were not so equipped-will gradually disappear." UHF is
certainly the principal source of supply elasticity in the long run.
But the potential contribution of UHF to responsiveness of aggregate
supply in the commercial field to reduced interconnection rates is
problematical, at least for the foreseeable future. UHF does not today
offer an important competitive alternative to VHF. As Table 3 demon-
strates, the 100 commercial UHF stations in 1965, amounting to 17
per cent of the number of non-netvork-owned commercial stations, ac-
counted for only slightly more than 5 per cent of the aggregate revenues:
average revenue per station in the UHF group was approximately
$500,000; in the VHF group, the comparable figure was almost
*1,900,00035 These facts surely reflect to a considerable extent the
temporary circumstance that in 1965 most households were still not set
up to receive UHF signals, which were in any case of poorer quality
and lesser strength than VHF. The commercial weakness of UHF
might also be due to such longer-run handicaps as the slowly changing
pattern of viewer habits, the inadequacy of programming available to
new entrants36-itself the consequence of the virtually complete cover-
age already afforded the present networks by existing affiliates-and the
growing competition of the rapidly spreading community antenna
systems (CATV).37 To what extent and at what rate these handicaps
may be expected to disappear, and what marginal contribution to their
34. A survey in August 1965 showed that 22.8 per cent of TV homes had receivers
equipped for UHF. 32 FCC AN. REP. 103 (1966). The Commission has estimated that
the figure would rise to 70 per cent by 1970. Seiden, An Economic Analysis of Community
Antenna Television Systems and the Television Broadcasting Industry, appendix A to
1965 FCC PRorss REPORT, in Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commumcations of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 89-18, at 114 (1965).
35. This disparity would be even greater if the very lucrative and large network-owned
VHF stations were included in the latter group. Another indication of the marginal
character of the UIF operations in the past is that in every year but one during the
period of 1952-61 the UHF stations as a group reported net losses. Their aggregate profits
before taxes in 1962 through 1964 were $0.9, $0.2 and $2.7 millions respectively; the cor-
responding totals for the non-network-owned VHF stations were $199.3, $206.8 and $;256A
million. TELEVISION FAcraoos 45-a (1966). These comparisons may exaggerate the dis-
parity, for our purposes, because profits of small companies may be understated by the
distribution of profits in the form of salaries to owner-managers. In an), event these older
figures, in considerable measure, are irrelevant as a clue to the future of UHF, as the
effects of the all channel receiver law take hold. The UHF stations as a group slipped back
into the red in 1965 and 1956; but, as the FCC reported, this was a reflection largel of
initial losses sustained by some of the newly installed stations. FCC, FINANCIAL AND '4-
PLOYEE DATA RESPECrING MAJOR NETIWORKs (196).
36. N~rvoPx BROADCAsrNG 220-25.
37. CATV has been spreading precisely in those markets not otherwise receiving pro-
grams from all three networks, thus possibly forestalling entry of a local network alfiliate;
on the other hand, it has helped UHF stations by making their programs available to
the majority of sets not equipped to receive their signals directly. See, e.g., Seiden, supra
note 34, at 82-90; Fisher, Community Antenna Television Stations and the Regulation
of Television Broadcasting, 56 Air. EcoN. Rrv. PArrEs & PRocErrnNCS 328-29 (1966).
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demise reduced interconnection rates might make, we cannot state
with confidence. It remains true, for the reasons already advanced in
our discussion of VHF, that such UHF stations as are likely to be in-
duced to enter the commercial field by lower interconnection rates will
be located only in those remaining, thinly populated areas that are not
now served by affiliates of the three networks38 or by the burgeoning
CATV systems, since these are the only stations for which transmission
costs bulk large relative to revenues. Accordingly, the quantitative con-
tribution of reduced rates to expansion of supply is likely to be slight.
The central economic point is that the more inelastic the supply-
that is to say, the less the distribution of additional advertising revenues
to local affiliates brings more network and other programming to more
homes-the more the cost-savings from satellite transmission will go sim.
ply to swell the economic rents and already excessive profits of the exist-
ing local stations.39 These companies hold franchises to use the limited
number of available public airways. They have something like a fixed"output" to sell-the total time in which they may be broadcasting.4 0
They also, it seems impossible to doubt, are profit-maximizers. 41 Their
rate of return is' even further above the average than the networks.42
There is no reason to expect them to do anything but pocket whatever
larger share they may receive of network advertising revenues. There is
no reason why they should be expected to use such windfalls to increase
38.- We consider in the succeeding section the possibility that enhanced entry of UHF
stations and of a new network or networks may go hand in hand, each dependent on the
other. This would open up opportunities for new stations in denser markets as well.
39. To the extent that their profits are further insulated by FCC limitations on com.
mercial competition--on new stations and on CATV-they partake of the nature of
monopoly profit as well as pure economic rent. This inverse relationship between supply
elasticity and economic rents is more fully described and illustrated in Kahn, The Deple.
tion Allowance in the Context of Cartelization, 54 Am. EcoN. Rav. 289, 289-91 (1964).
40. The output can be expanded to the extent they do not broadcast 24 hours a day.
But they cannot expand their broadcasting at prime times of the day.
41. It is our impression that this characterization is even more true of the local
stations than of the networks. In our experience, the affiliates exercise their rights of
program selection far more often to refuse the public service than the commercial pro-
grams proffered by the networks. In his justly famous "vast wasteland" speech, Newton H,
Minow, then chairman of the FCC referred to this practice and expressed the view thatlocal stations should be required to explain all such refusals. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1961,
at 91, col. 3.
42. See Table 1 and the discussion of it supra. The present owners of TV stations
almost certainly do not earn quite such high rates of return as are indicated by Table I
on the dollars they have actually invested in these enterprises. This is because many of
them have bought the stations from others, at prices capitalizing the immense profits on
original investment, see note 50 infra; whereas, as we understand it, the FCC continues
to list the book value of the tangible assets thus acquired at original cost, at time of
construction. This transfer of economic rents or monopoly profits from purchasers to
original owners in no way modifies the economic significance of the supernormal returns
or the merits of increasing them by reducing interconnection charges.
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the variety of their own programming, or to originate more programs lo-
cally: on the contrary, they would receive the enhanced revenues only to
the extent that they took advantage of the lower transmission costs and
hooked up with networks to carry more of their programs.
Of equal weight is a qualitative consideration not heretofore men-
tioned. It is highly questionable whether a few more commercial sta-
tions of essentially the same kind as we now have or a somewhat greater
availability to and acceptance of network programming by local stations
would represent as significant an expansion of "output," even in the
strict economic sense of providing more choices for viewers, as the alter-
native of directly subsidizing ETV. Since support for this judgment de-
pends on an assessment of the performance of the industry under its
present structure, we defer further consideration of it to Part II, below.
E. Entry of a New Network
The preceding analysis has shown that passing on the lower intercon-
nection costs made possible by a satellite system to existing networks
would do little to increase the supply of their services to the ultimate
viewing public. The possibility must also be examined, however, that
such lower interconnection rates would facilitate the entry of a new net-
work.
The principal barrier to entry into the national networking business,
now completely in the hands of CBS, NBC, and ABC, has been the ab-
sence of a sufficient number of unaffiliated stations in the major markets
of the country to put together into a fourth network.43 The now rapidly
increasing audience for UHF outlets as more and more sets become
equipped to receive their signals has brightened the prospects for prolif-
eration of new stations in this arena. Moreover, the promise of a new
network would itself further encourage the entrance of new UHF sta-
tions, since prospective broadcasters have been deterred from tackling
markets already blanketed by affiliates of existing networks by the un-
availability to them of regular network programming.
But the question is to what extent passing on the cost-savings from a
communications satellite would hasten the emergence of a new network.
At first blush it might appear that the contribution could be consider-
able. We have already noted that interconnection costs are an important
determinant of the economic feasibility of marginal stations. They have
also been an important deterrent to the formation of new networks and
the survival of an old one-DuMont, which went out of business in
43. See NmrwoRK ThO3ADCAST1G 195-206 for an excellent discussion.
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1955. However, the supposed relationship between interconnection
rates and network entry dissolves under further analysis.
We can fairly easily dismiss the first possible connection between the
two-the surmise that any retention of the cost savings by the networks
themselves in the form of higher profits would make entry more attrac-
tive. Network profits have been extremely high for a decade or more-at
least for NBC and CBS. If competitors have failed to appear and one
has disappeared, the reason could not have been an insufficiently attrac-
tive level of earnings in the successful firms already in the business; it
could only have been that new entrants could not have hoped to dupli-
cate the success of the incumbent giants.
But what of the possibility that lower interconnection rates would
eliminate the cost obstacle to launching new stations? As we have al-
ready observed, this limitation is important only in inverse proportion
to the size of the station's potential viewing audience; it is an important
factor, in brief, only in the relatively sparsely settled areas of the coun-
try, the thin markets, where interconnection costs bulk large relative to
prospective revenues. What a new network needs if it is to succeed is
rather access to stations in the dense, profitable market areas. In these
areas the deterrent has been the shortage of available VHF channels, not
the costs of connection.
What, then, of the fact that program transmission charges have been
cited by national networks like DuMont and specialized, occasional
users like Sports Network, Inc., as a serious handicap? The answer is
that the difficulties of these companies have been caused far less by the
absolute level of interconnection rates than by their structure. A new
(or struggling, smaller) network must necessarily begin (or carry on) its
programming on a modest basis-perhaps for an hour or two a day. Yet
the structure of A.T.&T. tariffs has been such that the costs of intercon-
nection for anything less than eight hours a day of continuous service
have been on the order of six to seven times as high, on an hourly basis,
as the costs of continuous, eight-hour-a-day interconnection, of which
the regular networks alone have been able to take advantage. 44 The or-
44. ABC has found this structure a handicap as well, at least in the past. NETWORK
BROADCASTING 201-03, 541-42, 546, 552. In 1966 the FCC designated for hearing a com-
plaint by Sports Network against A.T.&T., which "alleged that the minimum usage
periods and corresponding rates for interexchange channels to TV program transmission
were unreasonable and discriminatory as applied to users of less than the minimum periodof service provided in the tariffs." 1966 FCC ANN. Ra,. 56; Sports Network, Inc. v.
A.T.&T., Dkt. 16043 (FCC, May 4, 1966). In 1967, the new United Network began pro-
gramming with a two-hour variety show and two complaints. One was of having to pay
the full-time rate when it required (for the time being) only two hours, five days a week.
The other was of the provision in the tariffs prohibiting it from subleasing the unwanted
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der of magnitude of the handicap inherent in the rate differentials is,
thus, six to seven times as important as any possible saving issuing from
a reduction in average costs-i.e., in rate levels.
We know of no reason why such a rate differential would be any more
readily eliminated under satellite than under underground transmission.
The principle is widely known and accepted that a public utility com-
pany which provides service under conditions of long-run decreasing cost
may find it economically desirable and beneficial to all customers to
charge differential prices down to long-run marginal cost to classes of
users with higher elasticities of demand.4a So it might well be appropri-
ate here for rates to be reduced very sharply below average total costs for
occasional or less-than-eight-hours-daily contractual network users who
could not otherwise survive, provided such rates did cover the incre-
mental costs of that service. The Ford proposal should be qualified to
incorporate such price discrimination, where the foregoing conditions
are encountered. It should be noted, however, that representatives of
A.T.&T. have made just as convincing arguments for this principle by
demonstrating that their long-lines business has precisely the requisite
long-run-decreasing-cost characteristics, as have analysts of communi-
cations satellites.40
In short, while the prospects look the brightest in decades for the en-
try of a new network, it appears that reduction in transmission costs
would make but a slight contribution to that development. And with re-
gard to even that slight prospective contribution we must apply the same
kind of qualitative reservation as we have expressed about the opening
up of a few additional commercial stations: the entry of a new network
would not significantly change the character of the alternative programs
made available to the viewers, any more than did the introduction of the
American Broadcasting Company network many years ago.0 7 The reason
time to other users and prohibiting groups of part-time users from pooling their require-
ments. Gould, TV: Dana Starts on United Network, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1907, at 91, ol. 2.
The United Network has since dissolved.
45. See, e.g., Clemens, Price Discrimination in Decreasing Cost Industries, 31 Au. Eco:.
REv. 794 (1941).
46. See the testimony of Albert M. Froggatt, James C. Bonbright and William J.
Baumol, Bell Exhibits 24, 25 and 26, in Dkt. 16258 (FCC, May 31, 1966); Johnson. Joint
Cost and Price Discrimination: The Case of Communication Satellites, in W. SnarnEan &
T. GrEs, UILr= REGULATION 112 (1966). It is entirely possible that the costs of. say, two
hours a day interconnection are substantially the same as of eight hours, if the two hours
are scheduled during the hours of peak utilization, and so require installation of just as
much additional capacity as the eight. But if long-run marginal costs are less than
average, it could still be justifiable to charge lower rates to potential users excluded from
the market by the uniform eight-hour charge.
47. The organizer of United Network is the former president of ABC's television net-
work. The first show (and last, to our knowledge) was a "two-hour variety from Las
Vegas." See the Jack Gould review, supra note 44.
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for this must be sought in the defects inherent in the basic economics of
the television industry, which even a 33 1/3 per cent increase in stations
and network programming would not significantly remedy. We analyze
these defects in part II.
II. The Costs of the Tax Related to the Benefits of the Expenditure
At the outset we disavowed any intention of directly appraising the
positive case for public subsidization of ETV. Our principal purpose has
been to analyze the impact of the Ford Foundation's proposed method
of financing that subsidy, mainly in terms of its allocational effects but
with an eye to its distributional consequences as well. Our conclusion is
that the tax is an extremely attractive one as taxes go, and we summarize
our reasoning on this score below. But this conclusion does not answer
the questions of whether the tax is worth levying at all or whether there
is any logical connection between this particular tax and the particular
proposed use of the proceeds. To answer these questions we must look at
least briefly at the positive case for subsidizing ETV.
A. The Case for Subsidizing ETV
The present structure of the television industry makes optimal eco-
nomic performance impossible if competitive behavior is unregulated.
Inasmuch as the number of stations that are and can be licensed to serve
any particular area is limited, the two prime structural requirements for
effective competition-a large number of competing suppliers and free-
dom of entry-are precluded in both networking and broadcasting.
Thus, since television franchises are in essence selling a non-reproduc-
ible good whose total supply is fixed by the circumstances of nature-a
fixed amount of time on a fixed number of channels48-the principal ef-
fect of increases in national income and population, which make adver-
tisers willing to pay more for access to television audiences, 4 will be to
bid up the rents earned by this scarce resource rather than to increase its
supplyC°
48. We have also qualified this observation to recognize that the supply of actual
broadcasts is not entirely fixed, but can to some extent be increased as it becomes
economical for stations to operate more or fewer hours of the day and for stations to
be set up in thin markets. And supply and quality of programs can similarly be varied.
49. There has occurred, in addition, a shift toward television relative to other ad-
vertising media. The proportion of total national advertising expenditures going to tele-
vision increased from 11.0 to 16.5 per cent between 1955 and 1965. TEnvWssxN IiAcrJoox,
1966; PRINs' INK, 1955-56.
50. The dollar expenditures for TV advertising include payment for programs as well,
the "supply" of which is expansible. And, as we have observed, ever the nominal time
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Mere inelasticity of supply is not in itself incompatible with effective
competition, and large economic rents may be earned even in highly
competitive industries.Y' But the small number of sellers of television
services--of networks and of broadcasters in each local market-and the
high barriers to competitive entry also make effective competition un-
likely. We are not concerned here with tracing the extent to which these
apparent structural defects produce defective performance in all its vari-
ous aspects-profits, quality of service, innovation, and so on. But we
must examine one aspect of economic performance that is directly rele-
vant to the Ford proposal-namely the failure of the structure of the in-
dustry to permit economically optimal use of the limited radio spec-
trum.
We define "economic optimality" on the assumption of consumer sov-
ereignty. Thus, our question is whether the limited spectrum is em-
ployed to generate the maximum of viewer satisfaction over costs, taking
consumer or viewer preferences not as they ought to be or as we would
have them be, but as they are in fact-i.e., as they would be expressed in
theory by the price consumers would be willing to pay for watching tele-
vision and as they are expressed in practice by consumer decisions to
watch or not to watch television.
Each commercial television station is understandably under consider-
able pressure to sell or lease its limited available time to the highest bid-
der. Since the bidders are advertisers, the amounts they are willing to
bid, again understandably, depend on the size of the prospective audi-
ence for the programs with which their messages will be associated.
Therefore, each station is under pressure to devise programs that will
appeal to the largest possible number of viewers.52 Other considerations
charges vary with the quality of the programs presented. And there are of course capital
and operating costs involved in broadcasting. It is impossible to scparate out from these
outlays the true payment for the time alone, for the right to use the aivaves, which is
the pure economic rent. An indirect reflection of it would be found in the notoriously
large amounts paid in excess of physical reproduction costs for existing stations whenthey are sold. The difference dearly represents the -alue of the license itself and thatin turn represents a capitalization of the economic rent which the license entitles the
station to collect for the sale of access to this scarce resource.
51. There have been analogous controversies concerning (a) the effectiveness of competi-
tion and (b) the inelastidty of supply and allegedly high economic rents in the production
of natural gas. See, e.g., Dirlam, Natural Gas: Cost, Conseration, and Pricing, 48 Ams.
ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC-EDINGS 491-95 (1958); Kahn, Economic Issues in Regulating the
Field Price of Natural Gas, 50 Am. ECON. REv. P.,.Pm.s & PRocr mcs 505 (1950);
P. MfAcAvoY, PaxcE FonrAT oN IN NATURAL GAS FIELDs, chs. 1, 8 (1952). All that is neces-
sary for a large portion of an industry's revenues to consist in or be distributed in the
form of economic rents is that there be a marked difference in the productivity of the
best, the average and the marginal resources engaged in its production-that is, that its
marginal cost curve be steep.
52. For eloquent and convincing arguments-one highly critical, the second matter-of-
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aside, this result would seem to be economically desirable under the
standard of economic optimality we are applying.
But when the number of available stations in any area is limited, the
commercial motivation will tend to have the effect of forcing competing
stations to put on programs that are highly similar, even identical. If
they do this, it can be demonstrated by simple arithmetic that they will
thereby fall short of the economic optimum. Suppose, for example, that
four stations serving a particular area have the alternative of putting on
a popular football game, whose anticipated total audience is, say, 100,
000 viewers, or a public-service program offered to them by a network,
with a potential audience of, say, 20,000 viewers. All four will be
strongly tempted to put on the football game, with the probability that
each will in this way have an audience of 25,000 viewers; it would pay
none of them to run the public-service program. Thus, if the criterion of
the most efficient use of the limited channels available is taken to be
given the maximum number of viewers what they want and (they or ad-
vertisers) are willing to pay for,5 3 the competition between the four sta-
tions, each striving intensely to do precisely that, fails to produce the de-
sired result. The four could have satisfied 120,000 viewers; instead, they
have satisfied only 100,000.54
Thus, even if reducing interconnection rates to networks would in-
crease somewhat the number of television stations, it would probably
not significantly increase program variety. So long as the average ex-
pected audience per station for a popular entertainment program ex-
ceeds the total expected audience for some other kind of program, the
latter will not be shown.r; By the same reasoning there seems to be an
fact, the third defensive-that this is pretty much how the industry behaves, see M. WEN-
BERG, TV IN AmERicA, THE MoRALrry oF HARD CASH (1962); Eck, The Real Masters of
Television, HARPER's MAGAZINE, Mar. 1967, at 45-52; Blank, The Quest for Quality and
Diversity in Television Programming, 56 Am. EcoN. REV. PAPERS & PROCEDINGS 448.56
(1966).
53. This last condition is necessary if the market test is to be met. The (variable) costs
of program production and transmission must be covered by the value advertisers place
on the attention of the audiences each program will attract. The point is that with it
limited number of stations their self-interest in programming for the mass audience ie.
suits in the exclusion of other programs that could meet the market test, and a consequentfailure to reach the maximum audience that could economically be reached.
54. Optimum results could be achieved by the stations in this situation if they could
agree to divide markets and share revenues and goodwill. At present, such behavior
would probably violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). In any case,
the cost of bargaining over the allocation of programs, audiences and profits might be
prohibitive.
55. In the simple example we have just presented, a fifth station would find It just
as profitable to adopt the public-service program as to share with the existing four stations
the viewers of the football game: it could expect to have an audience of about 20,000 In
either case. But suppose, instead, that there were two football games available, one with
a potential audience of 50,000, the other of 66,000. In that event, if there were four
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inherent tendency for each of a small number of stations to show pro-
grams-and sequences of programs during prime viewing hours--of
similar types, with a consequent failure to maximize net benefits to
viewers and potential viewers.5 The tendency applies, of course, to the
programming decisions of the networks as well. The strength of the ten-
dency is suggested by the fact that advertisers who were willing to pay
the direct costs (including the returns normally earned in the industry
for the time in question) of a relatively unique program catering to a
smaller but distinctive audience have at times been refused access to
prime viewing time on the ground that they would be cutting down the
network's audience at adjoining times: obviously, if the networks are
correct, their programs must be so similar that to many people the differ-
ences in their values is smaller than the cost of changing stations.
Moreover, the consequence of having the choice of television pro-
grams dictated by the needs of advertisers is to establish appeal to the
maximum number of potential buyers, rather than the maximum satis-
faction of television viewers, as the principal criterion of program selec-
tion. And while these two standards will tend toward the same result,
they need not always coincide, particularly if differences in the intensity
of satisfaction from particular program variations are taken into ac-
count.57 To take a simple-minded example, suppose that the more intel-
ligent the viewer the more impervious he is to advertising messages.
Then, to the extent advertisers are rational, the interests and tastes of
the more intelligent potential viewers will carry less weight in program
stations, two would be inclined to show the first football game (each then hoping to have
an audience of 95,000) and the other two the second (with an audience of 33,000 each).
Entry of a fifth station, in these circumstances, would simply mean that three rather than
two stations would show the second football game. Even though for the viewing public
136,000 viewers are better than 116,000, for the individual station, 22,000 football fans
look better than 20,000 eggheads.
56. See the systematic presentation by Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and
the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. Eco.N. 194 (1962). The
demonstration can readily be extended, as by Steiner, to take account of differences among
the viewers in the intensity of the satisfaction they derive from different kinds of pro-
grams. For a similar demonstration that the effect will be to produce not the first-choice
programs for the maximum number of viewers but the "lowest common denominator"
see Rothenberg, Consumer Sovereignty and the Economics of TV Programming. STuDits
N PUBLIC COsMs sUNCATOxNs, No. 4, at 45-49 (1962). In short, commercial television provides
an excellent illustration of the uneconomic tendency of competing sellers to duster, noted
many years ago by Harold Hotelling, with the result that "buyers are confronted every-
where with an excessive sameness." Hoteffing, Stability in Competition, 39 ECo.V. J. 54
(1929).
57. See, e.g., Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 7 J. LAw &
ECON. 71, 74-76 (1964).
In the 'Golden Age' of television drama, the advertisers believed that the ideal play
for television must not be too boring or the viewer would switch to another channel.
nor too interesting or the viewer would resent the commercial break. Happily for all
concerned, this truly golden mean was achieved more often than not.
Vidal, supra note 14, at 25.
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selection than those of the more gullible purchasers of the advertised
product.
In brief, the television industry as presently constituted does an excel-
lent job of showing the kinds of programs that are marketable to adver-
tisers. It does a much less creditable job of making available to viewers
programs that, while not as attractive to advertisers, are none the less
economically feasible: there are additional viewers whose desires can
economically be satisfied without sacrificing the interests of those who
are at present well served.
Here is a gap that ETV could well fill. It could, at little cost to the
mass audiences, supply for the benefit of the more highly differentiated
audiences the relatively distinctive programs that are economically feasi-
ble but in large measure passed up by commercial broadcasters. This
case for ETV is of course immeasurably stronger if we may assume that
present consumer tastes either need not be taken as unchangeable, or
else need not be assigned the exclusive role of determining what kinds
of programs should be shown. Moreover, the discussion so far has as-
sumed that the benefits received by viewers qua viewers comprise all the
social benefits television can provide. Clearly, however, this assumption
is not justified where ETV provides benefits not only to its viewers but
also to the public at large, with the result that even a perfectly competi.
tive market would fail to register the sum total of the social benefits it
would confer. In short, ETV is a public good which even a perfectly
competitive market would not produce in adequate quantities.68
B. The Relation of Costs to Benefits
Thus, it seems safe to conclude that the subsidization of ETV would
considerably improve the performance of the television industry, in
both economic and non-economic terms. How then do these benefits
compare with the costs of the tax, and what, if any, is the case for put-
ting the two together in a single package?
The tax is a very attractive one, as taxes go. It has a positive justifica.
tion on equitable, or distributional, grounds: the government would be
merely refraining from adding to economic rents and monopoly profits
that are already excessive and that result from its free dispensation of ex-
58. See generally F. BATOR, THE QuEsTIoN OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING, dh. 6 (160).
These inadequacies in the purely economic performance of the industry-and, a fortlori,
any possible inadequacies in its performances as judged by social, aesthetic or political
considerations-are a reflection on neither the motives nor the intelligence of the broad-casters or their advertisers-customers. They are the inevitable consequence of the structure
of the industry, the method by which the industry finances its operations, and the nature
of the good it provides.
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clusive franchises to use the limited spectrum.r ° Since the cost-savings in
question are themselves the product of taxpayer-financed research and
development, it would seem particularly appropriate for taxpayers and
not television companies to benefit from this achievement. On these
grounds the tax would seem to be unambiguously preferable to such ob-
vious alternatives as the income tax or excises on television receivers.
It would seem to be preferable on economic grounds as well. The
usual economic objections to above-marginal-cost pricing, we have seen,
do not have any significant application in this instance. It appears that
demand would not be very responsive to a rate reduction; so the propo-
sal would not significantly discourage economically desirable uses of the
communication service. This "tax," therefore, unlike most others,
would distort only minimally the choices among various goods and ser-
vices and between work and leisure, consumption and saving, risky and
riskless investment.
What makes the use of this particular tax to finance this particular
government subsidy an extremely attractive package is the very real eco-
nomic connection between the two parts. Because of its peculiar struc-
ture, the television industry's performance is defective. The perfor-
mance could be markedly better than it is. That it is not reflects an er-
ror of public policy, the error of making gifts of monopolistic franchises
without imposing corresponding obligations with respect to program
content or diversity. It is that very error that has conferred on the indus-
try the great economic rents that make the proposed tax unusually at-
tractive on distributional grounds. Merely reducing interconnection
charges would not substantially improve the industry's structure or en-
rich the program alternatives it offers to viewers: this is what makes the
tax relatively attractive (more precise, less unattractive than most) on
economic grounds. Using the cost-savings instead to support ETV
would do precisely what rate-reduction would not do, and do it openly,
directly and in full measure, no need for the far more difficult undertak-
ing of regulating the quality of commercial programming. It would in-
crease the genuine diversity of programming, and in so doing come
much closer than the industry does today to maximizing the benefits ob-
tamined from the limited spectrum. The benefits of the Ford proposal
would far outweigh the costs.
59. Admittedly, if the government were to auction off these licenses, both for new
stations and for renewals, this strong equity argument for the Ford pro.oma1 would be
somewhat attenuated. See, e.g., Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw
& EcoN. 1 (1959); Levin, supra note 14.
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